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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and 
European Commercial Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation at the International 
Hellenic University.  
The protection of personal data is at the heart of the interest and plays great 
role both socially and economically. The adoption of General Data Protection 
Regulation by the European Union created the right conditions for a better 
interpretation of the concept of personal data and for its practical implementation. 
It set out the new framework for protecting the personal data of European Union 
citizens in general and in particular the rules on their collection, use and storage, 
while enacting the right to erasure which is one of the most debated and 
controversial rights in the digital age.  
This study will first examine the concept and nature of personal data and 
data protection, the concepts and scope of the right to erasure and the relation 
between the right to erasure and other fundamental rights and freedoms, such as 
the freedom of expression, the right to historical memory, the freedom to conduct 
a business and the right to intellectual property. It will follow a reference to the 
‘time’ as a determinative factor about erasure or retention of data and, finally, a 
reference will be made to the technological challenges in applying the right to 
erasure. 
Finally, I would like to thank my Supervisor, Prof. Komninos Komnios, for his 
guidance and support in writing this Thesis.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid evolution of the Internet and its participatory nature have led to 
increased risks to the right to privacy, in particular in view of the technological 
possibilities provided for electronic user monitoring. Especially, due to the rapid 
technological advancement, a large amount of personal information is collected 
daily for each of us. These information include, among others, where we have 
moved, what our preferences are, what searches we have made on the internet, 
what recordings are available on the Internet regarding our family, our work, our 
public image. Thus, intentionally or not, our online profile is created, and the 
accumulation of large amounts of data is attained. Although the data is collected 
by a large number of public and private organizations and not by one, a really 
important question, especially today, is the role of search engines. It should also 
be noted that the storage of information is not only done by large organizations 
such as search engines, social media and application providers, but users 
themselves in the current form of the Internet, play an important role in the 
processing and sharing of data, re-produce data for themselves as well as for 
others.  
As everybody knows, information posted on the web is never forgotten. 
The problem becomes more obvious when information published on the internet 
no longer corresponds to the individual's image, especially when they are 
revealed without his consent, when they are inaccurate, misleading, or even 
worse completely false, or when the damage caused by the disclosure is not 
remedied. 
There is one thing that we can say for sure: our society is an information-
hungry society. Everybody asks for more and more information: advertising 
companies, public sector, individuals. There is a constantly ability to record each 
and every interaction of an individual’s life. Every activity which is mediated by a 
computer generates personal data that can be captured by anyone who wishes to 
use them to serve their purposes, regardless of the subject's will.  Both our on-
line behavior and our off-line behavior can easily be monitored.  
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It is an undisputed fact that search engines can collect a large number of 
data through web browsing or even mouse-moving1. Αs technology advances and 
search engines evolve, no one can exactly know the way that personal data is 
collected. Even more, no one can control what data has already been collected 
and how these have been or will be used in the future, since search engines 
operate independently of the data subject. It is no coincidence that the Working 
Party2 on Data Protection Issues of the European Union, on the one hand, 
emphasized the important role that search engines play in modern life and the 
information society and, on the other hand, highlighted the increase in the 
incidence of privacy violations3. 
Τhe right to the protection of personal data in all its forms must also be 
considered within the above-mentioned framework. The protection of personal 
data, as a concept that is shaped in parallel with the rapid development of 
technology and the constant changes in the operation of search engines, is at the 
center of interest at the present time, where the role it plays both socially and 
economically is now being realized.  In fact, according to recent studies4, the 
digital economy, which relies on the collection, processing and storage of 
personal data, accounts for 1/5 of global GDP, with the Internet itself being the 
pinnacle of globalization, uniting both commercial and industrial sectors. 
In view of the above, a reference will be made to the general need for the 
protection of personal data in the light of legislative developments at European 
level and, then, an extensive analysis of the right to erasure will follow.  
Αs has become clear from the brief introduction, the right to erasure of 
personal data is now a reality that all bodies responsible for the processing of EU 
                                                          
1
 N.Zheng, A. Paloski and H. Wang, ‘An Efficient User Verification System via Mouse Movements’, Proceedings of 
the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security (ACM 2011) 
<http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2046725>  accessed 12 November 2019 
2
 This Working Party was set up under Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC. It is an independent European advisory 
body on data protection and privacy. Its tasks are described in Article 30 of Directive 95/46/EC and Article 15 of 
Directive 2002/58/EC. The secretariat is provided by Directorate C (Civil Justice, Rights and Citizenship) of the 
European Commission, Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security, B-1049 Brussels, Belgium, Office No 
LX-46 06/80 
3
 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues Related to Search Engines’ (2008) WP 148 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation> accessed 10 November 2019. 
4
 Accenture Strategy και Oxford Economics , Digital Disruption: the Growth Multiplier, 2016, 
<https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insight-digital-disruption-growthmultiplier.asp> accessed 15 November 
2019 
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citizens' personal data should respect. The right to erasure wants to serve a 
natural need to combat the eternal memory of the internet, allowing some data 
to be lost, as would be the case with the endlessly pervasive nature of the 
internet. In theory, this right seems to be an important “asset” of a democratic 
society, where every individual has the right to information, self-determination 
and autonomous development, without being haunted by the mistakes of the 
past. However, the implementation of the right presents several practical 
problems, such as infringing on other fundamental rights and freedoms.  
This study will first examine the need for the protection of personal data and 
then the concept and nature of the right to erasure, as formulated by the European 
Union and its institutions, through the General Data Protection Regulation, but also 
through the Court of Justice's famous Google ruling, and the acceptance of these 
moves worldwide. Furthermore, this Dissertation Thesis will try to examine the 
“time” factor, as it is considered to be one of the most determining factors in finding 
the balance between memory and oblivion. Finally, there will be a research about 
the technological challenges that search engines face and how they can practically 
apply the right to erasure.  
 
2. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION 
2.1. The fundamental Right to Data Protection 
The protection of privacy is a guaranteed right of the European legal 
order. It is perceived as an expression of European democratic society. Τhe 
protection of personal data was born in the context of the right to privacy but is 
now a separate right, guaranteed both  within the European Union. 
 The need for privacy was preceded and initially defined as the right to 
leave one's privacy at home. In its evolution, the right to privacy can be regarded 
as a sphere of personal privacy, in which society or other persons cannot be 
unjustly invaded and, thus, constitutes an expression of the right to free 
development of the individual and of human dignity. The development of 
technologies and the ever-easier dissemination of information have created the 
need for one to be able to control his/her personal information. 
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The protection of personal data become relevant when data started being 
processed. Τhe massive processing of personal data that began in the late 20th  
century and the gradual domination of the Internet in all areas of life, led to the 
urgent need for separate legislative framework as it was immediately recognized 
by the European governments, that personal data issues could not be regulated 
by simple reference to the principles of privacy. Data protection has been a 
concern at an international level.  
Some countries, such as Sweden5, Germany6 and France7, adopted data 
protection legislation. Then, organizations such as the Council of Europe8 and the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development9 played an important 
role in establishing data protection framework at State level.  
The European Convention of Human rights first adopted ‘the right to 
respect for private and family life’ (article 8)10. For many years Article 8 ECHR was 
considered to offer sufficient safeguards to protect the private life of individuals. 
However, technological developments and all the changes they brought to life 
could not be foreseen. Another thing that could not be foreseen is how they 
would affect individuals' personal lives and their privacy rights. Τhe use of 
computers, in both  public and private sector, raised new, serious concerns11 
about whether these new technologies affected the rights of individuals. 
These concerns lead to the ‘Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data’ (Convention 108). This 
particular text was of great importance because the term ‘data protection’ was 
used for the first time in a legally binding international document. The Convention 
                                                          
5
 ‘The Data Act’. 
6
 ‘Act on Protection Against the misuse of Personal Data in Data Processing’.  
7
 ‘Loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés’ 
8
 ‘Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data’ 
(28/01/1981) 
9
 ‘Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data’ *23/09/1980+ 
10
 Addopted in 1950. 
11
  In 1968,  the CoE Parliamentary Assembly highlighted that ‘newly developed techniques such as phone-
tapping, eavesdropping, surreptitious observation, the illegitimate use of official statistical and similar surveys to 
obtain private information, and subliminal advertising and propaganda are a threat to the rights and freedoms of 
individuals and, in particular, to the right to privacy which is protected by Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights’. Council of Europe - Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Recommendation 509 (1968) - Human Rights 
and Modern Scientific and Technological Developments’ 
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was focused on the protection of individuals’ data and not on the right to privacy 
as it had been so far12.  
Despite the steps, undoubtedly, taken, it was clear that there were major 
mismatches in the protection of personal data between Member States. In the 
light of European integration, the European Commission pointed out the need for 
protection of the right to privacy and the need for no restrictions on the free flow 
of information between Member States.  
Taking into consideration all the aforementioned, τhe European 
Commission, in 1990, issued a proposal for a ‘Council Directive concerning the 
protection of individuals in relation to the processing of personal data’. This text 
formed the basis for the Data Protection Directive which was adopted in 199513. 
The key idea behind the Data Protection Directive was a high level of protection 
of personal data between all Member States and the facilitation of free flow of 
information. The Directive harmonized many, different approaches to data 
protection rules throughout the European Union but, also, offered some flexibility 
to its application. A typical example of the flexible application of the Directive was 
the Lindqvist case in which the European Court of Justice stated, inter alia, that 
“With regard to Directive 95/46, its provisions are necessarily relatively general, 
since it must be applied to a large number of very different situations. 
Consequently, contrary to what Mrs Lindqvist asserts, that directive correctly 
contains rules with some flexibility and in many cases entrusts the Member States 
with the task of regulating the details or choosing between alternatives.” 14 
 
2.2. From the Fundamental Right to Data Protection to the General 
Data Protection Regulation 
All  the aforementioned combined with the need for more legal stability 
and harmonization, in view of the internal market, have led to the need to find a 
                                                          
12
 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (ERA) and Council of Europe, Handbook on European Data 
Protection Law [Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2018] p. 23-26  
<https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/5b0cfa83-63f3-11e8-ab9c-01aa75ed71a1/language-
en>  accessed 19 November 2019 
13
 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31 
14
 Lindqvist v Åklagarkammaren *2003+, Court of Justice of the European Union C-101/01 para. 83 et seq 
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law that would enhance accountability and create a fair system that would create 
confidence in data subjects, and  would give them the necessary guarantees  to 
feel more secure. This was the basis for the creation of the General Data 
Protection Regulation.  
Free movement of people, goods, capital and services within the Union 
required free flow of data. This could not be achieved unless all Member States 
adopt and rely on a uniform high level of data protection. So, on January 25th, 
2012, the European Commision proposed a reform to the existing legislation 
including the General Data Protection Regulation. The GDPR respected the 
principles of Data Protection Directive, while, at the same time, expanded them. 
Another important issue was that GDPR provided safeguards not only for the 
fundamental right to data protection, but also to other fundamental rights and 
freedoms, that are affected by data processing, such as freedom of expression, 
freedom of thought, freedom of association15. One of the main goals of the GDPR 
was to strengthen the rights of data subjects and ensure the existence of an 
effective and credible toolkit that will be available against any personal data 
breaches.  
The GDPR introduced a separate provision on the right to erasure (Article 
17) with the aim of further contributing to the empowerment of the individual as 
much as possible. Τhis Article has caused a lot of discussion and will be the central 
topic in the following chapters. The first two chapters were necessary in order to 
explore the history and rationale of the right to data protection, in order to, 
finally, be able to place to right to erasure in a broader framework and provide a 
detailed analysis of how the right to erasure operates itself, its scope, its 
requirements etc.  
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the  document Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for private life and the 
protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on 
Privacy and Electronic Communications) {COM(2017) 10 final} <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017SC0003> accessed 15 November 2019  
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3. The Right to Erasure 
"The Internet Never Forgets"16. This  statement that touches on the 
essence of the way the internet works, coupled with the cumulative storage of 
personal information about each of us,  lies at the heart of the debate on the right 
to erasure. By their nature, people are programmed to forget and remembering is 
the exception17 
Since the advent of technology in our lives, this balance has changed. As 
people realize how easy is to get details about someone online (whether posted 
by themselves or posted by others) and as long as social media play a leading role 
in our lives, the right to be forgotten becomes of greater importance. In a society 
where everyone can ‘see’ the whole life of another person just by the touch of a 
button, one realizes that the right to delete information that no longer reflects 
one’s image or has been made public without one’s consent is becoming 
increasingly important. The Google ruling18 of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, have urged the right to be brought to the forefront, with the result that 
the debate has recently been rekindled.  
However, the exact content of the right to erasure has not yet been 
clarified. Although it seems to be widely accepted as a concept, its practical and 
legal implications have not yet been thoroughly analyzed,19 while the various 
terminologies used make the content of this ‘new’ right even more difficult to 
define. Moreover, it is not irrelevant that one of the problems associated with the 
right to be forgotten is that it causes emotional and instinctive reactions, despite  
legal analysis, especially considering that the debate on the right to be forgotten 
internationally has started relatively recently.  
 
 
                                                          
16
 J. Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, New York Times, June 2010, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> accessed 23 
November 2019 
17
 V. Mayer-Schoenberger, Delete the Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age,[ Princeton University Press, 2009], 2 
18
 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González 
[2014], Court of Justice of the European Union C-131/12. 
19
  B.-J. Koops, Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows. A Critical Analysis of the “Right To Be Forgotten” in Big 
Data Practice. [Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 08/2012], 2 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986719> accessed 23 November 2019 
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3.1. The Google Spain Case 
The analysis of the right to erasure could not begin without a brief 
reference to the famous case of Google Spain, which is a benchmark for human 
rights in digital age.  
On March 5, 2010, a Spanish citizen, Mario Costeja Gonzalez, filed a 
lawsuit with a Spanish newspaper, Google Spain SL and Google Inc., before the 
Spanish Privacy Authority (AEPD). The applicant complained that any internet user 
typing his name into Google's search engine would receive two Spanish 
newspaper publications about an auction order for his home. The applicant 
requested that the newspaper delete its name from the relevant publications and 
Google to remove its specific personal data from the results it provides to its 
users. 
He claimed that enforcement proceedings against his home had been 
definitively terminated many years earlier and any reference to them has nothing 
to do with the present. 
The Spanish Data Protection Authority has rejected the request for the 
Spanish newspaper, but has accepted it as far as Google is concerned. According 
to the Authority, the newspaper was not obliged to revoke the publications, as 
the latter had been legally published at the date of their publication. 
Instead, it held that search engines are processors of personal data and therefore 
Google Spain and Google Inc. were required to delete personal data at the 
request of the person concerned. The Authority based its decision on EU Directive 
1995/46. Following this, Google Spain and Google Inc. appealed against the above 
judgment to the Spanish Supreme Court. The latter addressed the European Court 
of Justice with a series of questions for a preliminary ruling on the proper 
application of the Directive. 
The questions referred for a preliminary ruling were, inter alia, whether 
Google falls within the meaning of the data processor and also whether, as a 
European company, it was subject to the provisions of the Directive. In the 
affirmative, the European Court of Justice was required to determine Google's 
responsibility as a data processor and to determine whether a citizen has the right 
to ask Google to delete his/her personal data.  
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The European Court of Justice ruled that Google is, in fact, a data 
processor, as it collects personal data, and defines the purposes and means of 
data processing. The Court also held that Google Spain is essentially a subsidiary 
of Google Inc. and therefore Google Inc. is subject to the EU Directive. 
One of the highlights of the decision concerns the legal obligations of 
search engines, such as Google, in accordance with the Directive. The Court held 
in this regard that search engines have the right to process personal data where 
necessary to serve the legitimate interests of the data owner or third parties. 
This right is not absolute. It can be restricted when the interests or 
fundamental rights of the subject are violated - in particular the right to privacy.  
The Court has held that the data subject has undoubtedly a legitimate interest in 
refusing to publish his data, even if the publication is not harmful to him any 
longer. 
Therefore, the data subject - in this case Mr Costeja Gonzalez - may claim 
the erasure of his data if the information being published is inadequate, irrelevant 
or no longer relevant, or excessive for the purposes of the processing. 
The Court ruled that Mario Costeja Gonzalez was entitled to request 
erasure of his data from Google, with the latter being required to delete it. This 
decision therefore recognized ‘the right to be forgotten’  for the data subjects and 
at the same time the obligation of the data holder. 
 
3.2. The right to erasure after Google ruling 
Τhe aforementioned decision, in conjunction with other factors, triggered 
a debate about one's right to delete or not his/her personal data. 
It is true that technological explosion and economic progress, in 
combination with globalization and commercialization have led to the loss of data 
control by the data subjects themselves. The CJEU recognized this fact and 
imprinted it in its judgment.  
The Google Spain decision leaves the enforcement of the right to erasure 
in the hands of search engines. Data subjects who want links removed must file 
their requests to the search engine. Then, the search engine should examine the 
request and may either grant or deny. When a search engine denies a request, 
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the requester can choose to appeal to this decision to national data protection 
agency of each country20, or to the national courts, by suing the search engine.  If 
either the data protection agency or the court agrees with the data subject, then 
the search engine will be obliged to remove the specific data.  If search engine’s 
initial decision stand, the disputed content will remain accessible21.  
But, when a search engine grants a request, the path for those who are 
harmed by this decision is not really clear and unambiguous. A typical example of 
such a case might be the information-seeking public and the distributor of the 
content22. 
When a link is removed from search results, the search engine send a 
takedown notice to the content provider. This notice does not mention the 
person who requests for the erasure of the data, in order to protect their privacy.  
However, the notice mention which webpages will be deleted. The decision to 
send these notices based on the idea of some EU regulators who claim that the 
European Court’s decision should be communicated and, thus, the right to be 
forgotten could emphasized23.  
However, whenever there is such a request the search engine is called 
upon to make a very important decision that will affect a wide range of actors 
involved, such as users seeking information, the publisher of the information and 
the data subject itself.  
It is not a coincidence that Google’s immediate response to the new 
requirements that Google Spain Case placed was to set up an Advisory Council to 
Google in the Right to be Forgotten24. The Advisory Council issued its Report in 
                                                          
20
 National data protection agencies were created in accordance with the Data Protection Directive by each 
European Union Member State. They exist to ensure the appropriate enforcement of the Directive in each 
country. 
21
 S. Wechsler, The Right to Remember: The European Convention on Human Rights and the Right to Be 
Forgotten,[49 Colum. J.L.&Soc.Probs. 135,2015] p.142 
<https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/collsp49&id=142&men_tab=srchre
sults> accessed 25 November 2019  
22
 Ibid. p. 142 
23
 James Temperton, EU Demands 'Right to be Forgotten' be Applied Globally, [WIRED Nov. 26, 2014], 
<http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-11/26/eu-right-to-beforgotten-extended> accessed 25 November 
2019.  
24
 Foundation The Advisory Council was set up in 2014 and the Members  included: Luciano Floridi, Professor of 
Philosophy and Ethics of Information at the University of Oxford; Sylvie Kauffman, Editorial Director, Le Monde; 
Lidia Kolucka-Zuk, Director of the Trust for Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe; Frank La Rue, UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression; Sabine 
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, former Federal Minister of Justice in Germany; Jos6-Luis Pifiar, Professor of Law at 
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January 2015. Τhe Report included an overview of the Ruling, the nature of the 
rights at stake and, finally, the criteria for assessing delisting requests25. 
The Advisory Council made an effort to provide a comprehensive 
framework which Google, and generally, search engines could establish in order 
to evaluate the requests for erasure of personal data. Ηowever, as it was easily 
understood, the formation of such a framework is not easy. Τhis framework, as it 
has since been shaped through the theory and jurisprudence of the national and 
European courts, we shall endeavor to examine in the following pages. 
 
4. The concept of Personal Data 
Personal data is defined as “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person”26. Similar is the definition found in European Directive 
95/46/EC, which stipulates that personal data is any information that refers to a 
natural person whose identity is known or verifiable, and as a person whose 
identity may be verify is considered to be the person who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular on the basis of an identification number of one 
or more specific elements that characterize his or her existence as physical, 
biological, psychological, economic status.  
Τhe right to privacy and the right to the protection of personal data are 
often confused. The truth is that the two rights are related and even at the ECHR 
level they are protected by the same provision27, while at European Union level 
the protection of personal data has become an autonomous fundamental right 
since its imprint in a separate article in the Charter of Fundamental Rights28 and 
the judgment of the European Court of Justice decision in Case Promusicae29 30.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
Universidad CEU and former Director of the Spanish Data Protection Agency ("AEPD"); Peggy Valcke, Professor of 
Law at University of Leuven; and Jimmy Wales, Founder and Chair Emeritus, Board of Trustees, 
WikimediaFoundation. 
<https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/archive.google.com/el//advisorycouncil/advisement/advisory-
report.pdf> accessed 25 November 2019 
25
 Ibid. P. 7 et seq  
26
 Article 4(1) GDPR. See, Article 2b of the  Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data [Strasbourg, 28/01/1981] and Article 1b of the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data [2013] 
27
 Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
28
 Article 8 of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
29
 Promusicae v Telefonica [2008], Court of Justice of the European Union C-524/06. 
30
 Promusicae is a non-profit association of producers and publishers of music and audiovisual works. By letter of 
28 November 2005, it applied to the Juzgado de lo Mercantil nº 5 de Madrid (Fifth Circuit Court of Madrid) for a 
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Regarding Internet, there are three cases related to personal data31: the 
first is the publication of personal data on a web site, the second is where a 
search engine displays results that refer to other websites that have published 
personal data and the  third case is when an Ιnternet user uses some of the 
features offered to him, such as searching, and in this context some data which 
can reveal his/her identity, such as the IP address, is automatically transferred to 
the provider of the corresponding service. 
In the context of the protection of personal data, as technology evolves, 
concerns are raised about the risks of their misuse and whether the average user 
knows when and how they are violated. In particular, it is argued that the average 
user is unaware and unable to anticipate the risks that may arise from posting his 
personal data online. Usually, when they realize these dangers it is usually too 
late. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
preliminary ruling against Telefónica, a trading company engaged in, inter alia, the provision of Internet access 
services. Promusicae has requested that Telefónica be required to disclose the identity and physical address of 
certain persons to whom the latter provides internet access and whose 'IP address' and the date and time of 
connection are known. According to Promusicae, these people use a file-sharing program (called "peer to peer" 
or "P2P") called "KaZaA" and allow access to their personal computer's shared directory of phonograms whose 
assets royalties belong to members of Promusicae.  Promusicae has argued before the referring court that KaZaA 
users are competing unfairly and infringing their intellectual property rights. It therefore requested that the 
abovementioned information be disclosed in order to bring civil proceedings against the parties concerned. 
By order of 21 December 2005, the Juzgado de lo Mercantil nº 5 de Madrid granted Promusicae's application for 
preliminary injunction. Telefónica opposed that provision, claiming that, according to the LSSI, disclosure of the 
data requested by Promusicae is only permitted in criminal investigations or for the purpose of protecting public 
security and national defense and not in the context of civil proceedings or as a precautionary measure related to 
such a procedure. Promusicae has argued that Article 12 of the LSSI must be interpreted in accordance with 
several provisions of Directives 2000/31, 2001/29 and 2004/48 as well as Articles 17 (2) and 47 of the Charter, 
which do not allow Member States limit the obligation to disclose the relevant data only for the purposes 
pursued by the wording of that law. After a lot of discussion and many arguments the European Court of Justice 
ruled that: ‘Directive 2000/31 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of the information society services, in particular e-commerce, in the internal market ("e-commerce 
directive"), 2001 / 29 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization 
of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 2004/48 / EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the with ep infringement of intellectual property rights, and 
2002/58 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 on the processing of personal data 
and the protection of privacy in the field of electronic communications (Privacy Directive) (electronic 
communications), do not require Member States to provide, in cases such as the one in the main proceedings, 
with the obligation to disclose personal data in order to ensure that voluntary protection of copyright in civil 
proceedings. However, Community law requires that those States, when transposing those Directives into 
national law, ensure that they are based on their interpretation which enables a balance to be struck between 
the various fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order. Furthermore, when implementing the 
measures transposing those directives into national law, the authorities and courts of the Member States must 
not only interpret their national law in a manner consistent with those directives but also not rely on their 
interpretation. which could conflict with these fundamental rights or with other general principles of Community 
law, such as the principle of proportionality’. 
31
 Opinion of Advocate General JÄÄSKINEN, delivered on 25 June 2013, Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL Google 
Inc.v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) Mario Costeja González 
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So, it is important to know what could or has been done with this data 
that, for whatever reason, has escaped control of the data subject. Τhe subject 
should be able to know if and under what conditions he/she can delete the data 
or if he/she can somehow regain control of them. Can one just delete the data? 
What others options the data subject has? Can one totally be forgotten? This 
topic will be analyzed to the next chapter.  
 
5. Conceptualizing the right to erasure 
Αcademiccaly there is no uniformity in terminology when it comes to 
'deleting personal data'. Some use the terms “right to oblivion”, “right to forget”, 
“right to be forgotten”,  “right to delete” or “right to erasure" as synonyms32, 
others vary the terminology they use33. It is not far from the truth to talk about 
terminological chaos.  The term "right to digital oblivion" has also recently been 
introduced into the literature. In general, however, so far, not a uniform approach 
has been identified, that would clarify the problems of using different 
terminology and which, also, could clarify the substantial differences between the 
widely used terms. The interpretation given to the right to be forgotten is 
important, as the different meanings assigned to it require different technological 
means to achieve it34. 
 
5.1. The right to erasure 
The right to erasure in its first aspect, refers to the deletion of information 
posted on the Internet either by the data subject or by third parties. It can be 
‘seperated’ into two sub-aspects: on the one hand the right to erasure, enabling 
the deletion of personal data posted on the Internet with the consent of the 
individual, and on the other hand, the right to oblivion, which protects the 
                                                          
32
 See I. Inglezakis, The Right to Forget: A New Digital Right for Cyberspace, II.C, where he claims that the right  of 
a person to delete personal data concerning him is equivalent to the right to be forgotten 
<https://www.lawspot.gr/nomika-blogs/ioannis_igglezakis/dikaioma-sti-lithi-ena-neo-psifiako-dikaioma-gia-ton-
kyvernohoro> accessed 26 November 2019  
33
 See, R. Weber, The Right to Be Forgotten: More Than a Pandora’s Box?, JIPITEC 2011 (2),  120 para 2,3, . that 
distinguishes between the right to forget and the right to be forgotten < https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-2-
2-2011/3084/jipitec%202%20-%20a%20-%20weber.pdf> accessed 26 November 2019 
34
 ENISA, The right to be forgotten-between expectations and practice [20 November 2012]  
<https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/the-right-to-be-forgotten> accessed 26 November 2019 
 19 
 
individual from the possible consequences from the storage and processing of his 
personal data for a long period of time, which is founded and practiced over a 
period of time, so that the publication is no longer up to date35. 
The right to be forgotten aims to protect the reputation, identity and 
dignity of the person affected by the stay of information on the internet for 
longer than necessary. On the other hand, the right to erase data is intended to 
restore power between users and controllers, in the sense that since a person's 
consent to the processing of their data is rarely up-to-date, there must be a right 
to withdraw the consent of the user.  
Erasure should be considered as a narrower concept than the right to be 
forgotten.  The right to erasure does not necessarily relate to the passage of time, 
but aims to regain control over the subject of personal matters of data, regardless 
of time elapsed36. The purpose of the two rights is therefore different: the right to 
be forgotten, as a right derived from respect for the fundamental rights of privacy 
and personality, is based on the long tradition of balancing opposing interests, 
while the right to erasure can be seen as a procedural way of applying the 
substantive allegations of a breach of the provisions on personal data37.  It is in a 
way clear that the right to erasure is  more limited than the right to be forgotten. 
 
5.2.  The right to be forgotten 
The right to be forgotten is really vague and is used more as an umbrella 
clause. The right to be forgotten is described as the right of individuals to have 
information about them deleted after a certain period of time38. 
Τhe right to be forgotten has a broader scope and relates more to identity 
and self-determination. It has to do with “information that with the passing of 
time becomes de-contextualized, distorted, outdated, no longer truthful (but not 
necessarily false), and through which an incorrect representation of the 
individual’s identity is offered to the public’’39. 
                                                          
35
 Ι. Inglezakis, The right to oblivion and its limitations [Sakkoulas Publications, Athens, 2014] p 83 
36
 M. Ambrose and D. Ausloos, The right to be Forgotten across the Pond, JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 3 
[2013]: 1-23,  < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2032325> accessed 26 November 2019 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Ibid. p. 126 
39
 Ibid.  p. 127 
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Also, is often mentioned to the literature ‘right to forget’.  It encompasses 
the subjective right of individual’s control over his/her personal data and memory 
of one's past. The latter is understood not from a psychological point of view, but 
has legal and social implications, including the right not to be confronted with 
details of his past that he would have preferred to forget40. 
In any case, the ‘right to be forgotten’ but also ‘the right to forget’ 
constitute the two aspects of the so-called ‘right to oblivion’, which considered to 
be much wider, as will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
5.3. The right to oblivion 
The right to digital oblivion is a new and broad term that we find often 
both in literature and in case law. It relates to the publication of digital material 
data on the Internet and we could say that it is more a combination of different, 
autonomous rights, as it relies primarily on the right to the protection of personal 
data and, secondly, on the right to the protection of personality41. It mainly 
concerns personal information posted on a site, blog, social media and may have 
been reproduced by other media or displayed in search engine results. 
According to one opinion, the right to oblivion applies only to data that 
has been posted by the same subject, or to those that have been processed with 
his consent42. According to another opinion43, the right to digital oblivion is 
intended to give the person control over his/her digital world data, which 
basically are data stored online as well as organizational databases: 1) either 
                                                          
40
 B.-J. Koops, Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows. A Critical Analysis of the “Right To Be Forgotten” in Big 
Data Practice. [Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 08/2012],  
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986719> accessed 23 November 2019 
41
 M. Ambrose and D. Ausloos, The right to be Forgotten across the Pond, JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 3 
[2013]: 1-23,  p. 2 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2032325> accessed 26 November 2019 
42
 Ibid.  p. 7 
43
 N.N.G. de Andrade, Oblivion: The right to Be different….. from Oneself  Reproposing the Right to be Forgotten, 
European University Institute - Law Department; UC Berkeley Law School, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, 
[April 2012]  <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2033155> accessed 28 November 2019 
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posted by the data-subjects that is, the sο-called digital footprints44, 2) either 
posted or reproduced by others, the so-called digital shadows45. 
Under both concepts, it is obvious that the right to oblivion relies on the 
fundamental respect for privacy. It aims to prevent potential harm to personality, 
and reputation of an individual.  
Taking into consideration the aforementioned, there are two rights, of 
which the right to oblivion has to do more with the balancing of contradicting 
interests46(re-balance power between data subjects and data processors) and the 
right to erasure has to do more with a violation of data protection principles.47 
The scope of the rights may be considered different “...while the scope of the right 
to oblivion is limited to outdated data, the right to erasure potentially applies to 
any data whose processing violates data protection laws…”48 
Νotwithstanding the conceptual differences that may exist between the 
above terms, for the purposes of the this Dissertation Thesis they shall be used as 
synonyms. Because their categorization has proved particularly difficult for legal 
circles and because they overlap to an extent, it is preferable to use them as a 
single term. In general, until the formulation of a uniform framework for their use 
by theory and jurisprudence, it is difficult to assert with certainty that we have 
different, distinct terms. 
The fact that in this pepper the most commonly used term is 'right to 
erasure' has to do with the wording of Article 17 of General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), as this right is not considered as a stand-alone piece of 
legislation, but  in the light of the new pan-European legislative framework and 
within it. Τhe second most common term used here is ‘right to be forgotten’ as it 
is  commonly found in European case law. Ιn fact, in this Dissertation Thesis none 
                                                          
44
 ‘A person’s public identified footprint is any information that they created which is online, widely available, 
and specifically linked to author’s real name’, S. Garfinkel and D. C. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
USA, [February, 2009], <https://simson.net/clips/academic/2009.BL.InternetFootprint.pdf >, accessed 28 
November 2019 
45
 ‘Data shadows refer to the information that a person leaves behind unintentionally while taking part in daily 
activities such as checking their e-mails, scrolling through social media or even by using their debit or credit card’ 
P.N. Howard, New Media Campaigns and the Managed Citizen, Cambridge University Press, New York [October, 
2005], p. 93 
46
 A. Tamp and D. George, Oblivion, Erasure and Forgetting in the Digital Age, JIPITEC 5 (2) [2014] para. B II < 
https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-5-2-2014/3997> accessed 28 November 2019 
47
 Ibid.   
48
 Ibid. 
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of the aforementioned conceptual distinctions will be adopted, as we consider 
that the development of each one is still at an early stage. 
 
 
6. SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO ERASURE 
According to Aricle 17 of the GDPR “1. The data subject shall have the right 
to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her 
without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal 
data without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies:  (a) the 
personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they 
were collected or otherwise processed;  (b) the data subject withdraws consent on 
which the processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of 
Article 9(2), and where there is no other legal ground for the processing;  (c) the 
data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and there are no 
overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the 
processing pursuant to Article 21(2);  (d) the personal data have been unlawfully 
processed;  (e) the personal data have to be erased for compliance with a legal 
obligation in Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject;  (f) the 
personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of information society 
services referred to in Article 8(1).  
2. Where the controller has made the personal data public and is obliged 
pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the   personal data, the controller, taking 
account of available technology and the cost of implementation, shall take 
reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform controllers which are 
processing the personal data that the data subject has requested the erasure by 
such controllers of any links to, or copy or replication of, those personal data.  
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the extent that processing is 
necessary: (a) for exercising the right of freedom of expression and information; 
(b) for compliance with a legal obligation which requires processing by Union or 
Member State law to which the controller is subject or for the performance of a 
task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested 
in the controller;  (c) for reasons of public interest in the area of public health in 
 23 
 
accordance with points (h) and (i) of Article 9(2) as well as Article 9(3);  (d) for 
archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes 
or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) in so far as the right 
referred to in paragraph 1 is likely to render impossible or seriously impair the 
achievement of the objectives of that processing; or  (e) for the establishment, 
exercise or defence of legal claims.’’ 
It is true that the scope of the GDPR is quite broad. This is exactly one of 
the key innovations offered by the new Regulation. Because of the broad nature 
of the provision,  it must be absolutely clear the territorial, material and personal 
scope of it. In this chapter, there will be a brief report on GDPR in general, but in 
conjunction with Article 17 which is the subject of this paper. Ιt is vital to be 
absolutely clear what can be deleted, who can request the erasure and who is 
ultimately responsible to erase the information. Ιf these concepts are not distinct 
then how do we know what we can erase or who is responsible for that erasure? 
 
6.1. Material Scope 
GDPR refers specifically to personal data.  Article 3 (1) of GDPR  defines 
the term ‘personal data’ as: 1) any information, 2) relating to, 3) an identified or 
identifiable, d) natural person. It is obvious that the information need to relate to 
an individual. Such examples are health, social status, pictures of people or 
houses49, camera information or even accelerometer information50. Apart from 
the aforementioned, one of the most typical examples and commonly used 
technology systems for tracking personal data is tracking cookies, which are also 
considered to be personal data.  
The information mentioned above need to relate to an identified or 
identifiable natural person. The Working Party highlights that the person might be 
identifiable because some information concerning him/her combined with other 
                                                          
49
 Belgian Privacy Commission, Frequently Asked Questions - Google Street View, 
<https://www.dataprotectionauthority.be/faq-themes/the-internet/google-street-view> accessed 2 December 
2019.  
50
 S. Hemminki, P. Nurmi and S. Tarkoma, Accelerometer-Based Transportation Mode Detection on Smartphones 
[ACM Press 2013] < http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2517351.2517367>  accessed 02 December 2019 
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information will make the individual to be distinguished from others51. Also, the 
personal data protection provisions do not apply when dealing with anonymous 
data.52 
Ιt is beyond any doubt that the information must be relevant to a natural 
person53. Also, the GDPR explicitly exclude its applicability to legal persons54. 
Rights of legal persons are protected in other ways, whether in pan-European or 
national level. 55 
 6.2. Personal Scope 
Another important issue to determine the applicability of data protection 
law and, consequently, the right to erasure is the GDPR’s personal scope. This 
question is vital in order to understand who can invoke the right, whose interests 
are affected and, finally, who can delete the data.  
The first one to be protected is the data subject. Data subject is the 
natural person to whom personal data relates56. Data subjects enjoy equal rights 
under the umbrella of GDPR. But, there are certain categories of data subjects 
that may benefit more protection, such as minors or children (Article 8), and more 
vulnerable categories, like individuals with mental decisions or the elderly57.  
Οne more important question is who to ask for erasure. Mainly, the data 
controller58 and the data processor59 are sharing the responsibility in the light of 
exercising the right to erasure. The concepts of controller and processor is, in 
practice, quite vague and uncertain.  
                                                          
51
 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data,   
<https://www.clinicalstudydatarequest.com/Documents/Privacy-European-guidance.pdf> accessed 03 December 
2019.  
52
 Recital 26 GDPR ‘…The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, 
namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data 
rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does 
not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research 
purposes.’ 
53
 Recital 27 GDPR mentions that the Regulation “does not apply to data of deceased persons. Member States 
may provide for rules regarding the processing of data of deceased persons”. 
54
 Recital 14 GDPR states that “This Regulation does not cover the processing of personal data which concerns 
legal persons and in particular undertakings established as legal persons”. 
55
 For example, by Company law or by Competition Law. 
56
 See Article 4(1) GDPR 
57
 See Recital 75 GDPR, which refers to vulnerable natural persons.  
58
 Article 4(7) GDPR: “…’controller’ means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body 
which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data…” 
59
 Article 4(8) GDPR “…‘processor’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which 
processes personal data on behalf of the controller..” 
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From the perspective of the GDPR, a controller is the one who determines 
the purposes and the means of processing. The processor operates processing 
activities on behalf of the controller and it is usually a separate body/entity. It is 
really important to distinguish controller from processor in order to allocate 
liability in case of violation of personal data, determining the applicable law and, 
finally, ensure compliance with the requirements of data protection law. 
According to GDPR provision, requests for erasure of personal data are addressed 
to both processors and controllers.  
In fact, the distinction between controller and processor requires a case-
by-case analysis, taking into account the prevailing circumstances. In the cases we 
are considering in the present Thesis, search engines can be considered either 
controllers or processors, depending on the particular circumstances of each case. 
 
7. CONDITIONS OF THE RIGHT TO ERASURE 
Οne of the key aims of the right to erasure is to enable data subjects to 
regain control of their data. However, this does not mean that anyone can 
request erasure of data without any criteria, simply because the information is 
bothering him/her for some unspecified reason. This is exactly why Article 17 sets 
out the six (6) grounds for invoking the right to erasure. According to this Article 
there are some specific non-cumulative criteria for the application to erasure. As 
will become clear to the following pages, the preconditions for applying the right 
to erasure are closely related to other provisions in the GDPR.  
The first ground (Article 17(1)a) for requesting erasure is that the data 
subject believes that the data are no longer necessary for the purposes which 
they first collected. This is the so-called purpose limitation principle60 61 and is 
closely linked to Article 5(1)b GDPR. From the abovementioned provisions it 
follows that the purposes for data processing need to be specified, explicit and 
legitimate. When personal data is ‘inadequate, irrelevant or unnecessary’62 to 
                                                          
60
 Purpose limitation principle in not only found in GDPR but has already been specified by Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, Opinion 03/2013 on Purpose Limitation,<https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp203_en.pdf > [02 April 2013, WP 203] p. 15-20. 
61
 The purpose limitation principle also features in the Charter (Article 8(2)). 
62
 So-called data minimization principle established in Article 5(1)(c). 
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achieve those specific and in advance known purposes, the data subject can ask 
for erasure.  
The second ground to erasure is withdrawal of consent. Controllers may 
process personal data only if they have a ‘freely given, specific, informed and 
unambiguous indication of his/her wishes be which he or she, by a statement or by 
a clear affirmation action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data 
relating to him or her.’63 Requesting erasure under 17(1)b, provides that 
controller had obtained validly the consent of data subject in the first place.64 
Even if a data subject withdraw his/her consent, the controller might continue 
processing the same personal data on the basis of another lawful basis65. 
The third situation referred to in Article 17 which grants data subjects the 
right to erasure is upon a successful exercise of the right to object pursuant to 
Article 21 (1). There is a different scope between the two Articles. Article 17 aims 
to the prevention of processing of certain data which for some reason cannot be 
stored or in any other way processed by the controller while Article 21 aims to the 
prevention of further processing of specific data. Τhis provision actually attempts 
an (informal) opportunity for the controllers to choose between the two, 
weighing each time their particular circumstances and interests.  There must be a 
balancing of the profiling  for the controller himself, on the one hand, and on the 
impact of the profiling on the data subjects themselves, on the other hand.66  
The fourth situation in which data subject can invoke the right to erasure 
is when data have been unlawfully processed67. Lawfulness means to have a 
lawful ground for processing data under Article 6(1) GDPR. The requirement for 
having a lawful ground is closely linked to a specific processing operation. If, in 
this particular operation there is no lawful ground, there is a basis for applying the 
right to erasure.  
                                                          
63
 Article 4(11) GDPR and Recital 32.  
64
 In fact, it is very difficult for the controller to obtain the consent of the subject as there are many requirements 
that must be met in order for the consent given to be valid.  
65
 For example, on the ground of controllers’ legitimate interests (Article 6(1)f). 
66
 Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making and Profiling for the Purposes 
of Regulation 2016/679, (06 February 2018, WP251Rev.01)< https://iapp.org/resources/article/wp29-draft-
guidelines-on-automated-individual-decision-making-and-profiling> p. 18-19 
67
 Οne of the basic principles underlying GDPR is that of fair and lawful processing of data. 
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Furthermore, data subjects will have the right to erasure when such 
erasure is required in order to comply with a legal obligation in Union or Member 
State law to which the controller is subject. Three conditions must be met: a) 
necessity, b) a legal obligation and c) controller must be subject to that obligation. 
There is no specific reference but it is implied that there must be an urgent 
situation. GDPR does not clarifies what kind of legal obligation looks like and the 
term is quite vague, but Article 17(1)e requires the relevant legal obligation to be 
applicable to the data controller.  
Finally, the sixth and last ground aims to protect children. It grants data 
subjects the right to request for erasure of personal data when those data have 
been collected in relation to the offer of information society services directly to a 
child. It is crucial that the personal data was collected when the data subject was 
a child. The justification for such a provision is the fact that children need extra 
protection with regard to their personal data, because they may be less aware of 
the risks and safeguards about the processing of personal data.  
According to the aforementioned, it is obvious that GDPR sets the grounds 
for erasure but, whether the data subjects’ request will be parsed and the data 
erasure will follow is a question that depends on many factors, which we will 
analyzed in the following chapters. 
 
 
8. BALANCING AND CONFLICT WITH OTHER RIGHTS 
Although the ‘right to be forgotten’ is of undeniable value and importance, 
it raises both practical and substantive issues,  in relation to its conflict with other 
fundamental rights. That is why its conceptual distinction and the scope of its 
application, as mentioned above, are very important to be defined as clearly as 
possible. The right to be forgotten falls within the protective framework of Article 
8 (right to respect for private and family life) and, this right is exercised with 
respect to the content of other opposing rights. According to Article 8(2) of the 
ECHR, “The exercise of this right shall not be invoked by any public authority 
unless it is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society ….. 
to protect the rights and freedoms of others”. Full enjoyment of the right to be 
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forgotten will almost always be in tension with other fundamental rights and 
freedoms. Therefore, it is necessary to properly balance rights in the application 
and interpretation of Article 8 ECHR and Article 8 of the Charter68. Furthermore, it 
has been held that the fundamental right to the protection of personal data "is 
not absolute, but must be taken into account in relation to its role in society69".  
The balancing of opposing rights seems particularly difficult for a number 
of reasons. First of all, fair balancing cannot be defined at abstract level and its 
application should be considered by the particular context of each case. Indeed, 
when we have to do with fundamental rights it is difficult to decide in absolute 
terms and without second thought that one fundamental right or freedom 
overrides another.  
Fair balancing seems to be the preferred and appropriate mechanism to 
resolve conflicts between fundamental rights and freedoms. Some guidance on 
how to balance the rights involved can be found in Article 52 of the Charter, 
which sets the conditions under which the rights and freedoms can be limited and 
to what extent this limitation should be tolerated by the data subjects and by the 
legal system itself. Αn overview of the Αrticle shows that there are four 
prerequisites for the restriction to be lawful. Limitations must be: a) provided for 
by law, b) respect the essence of the relevant right and/or freedom, c) comply 
with the principle of proportionality and d) be necessary and genuinely meet 
objectives of general interest recognized by the Union, or the need to protect the 
rights and freedoms of others.  
As can be seen from the above, all the involved concepts are particularly 
vague and difficult to understand and apply. In particular, as regards the issue of 
limiting the core of the right, many views have been formulated from time to 
time. The European Data Protection Supervisor in an effort to facilitate fair 
balancing and to resolve the increasingly complex conflicts mentions that: “the 
                                                          
68
 See, Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito (ASNEF) and Federación de Comercio 
Electrónico y Marketing Directo (FECEMD) v Administración del Estado [24 November 2011] Court of Justice of 
European Union Joined Cases C-468/10 and C-469/10 
69
 See, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen [9 November 2010] Court of Justice of 
European Union Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09,  para. 48 
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limitation goes so far that it empties the right of its core elements and thus 
prevents the exercise of the right”70.  
According to the guidelines that European Data Protection Supervisor sets, 
there are some important steps to be taken into consideration, to assess the 
validity and necessity of the measures taken, in relation to the limitation of the 
rights and freedoms. There need to be a description of  the measure proposed, an 
identification of fundamental rights and freedoms limited by the processing of 
personal data,  a determination of the objectives of the measures and, finally, to 
choose an option that is effective and least intrusive71.  
Fair balancing is an idea that exists throughout the GDPR. GDPR aims to 
protect personal data and any limitation to that right will be scrutinized by the 
framework sets out in Article 52(1) of the Charter and according to the 
requirements which the regulation itself sets out. For limitations to the right to 
data protection GDPR foresees some clear justifications such as national security, 
public interest, defence etc. A wide range of provisions ensure a fair balance 
between rights, throughout the GDPR. First of all, the most notable is Article 5(1) 
(principles relating to processing of personal data), but, also, Article 9 and 10 
(processing of special categories of personal data) Article 12 (transparent 
information, Article 6(1) (compliance with a legal obligation) Article 21 (right to 
object) and others.  
We could claim that fair balancing operates as a principle underlying the 
whole framework of GDPR. Fair balancing in the GDPR implies personal data 
should not be processed in such a way which unreasonably infringes the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject or third people72.  
This chapter examines the conflict of the right to be forgotten with other 
rights and the efforts made by both theory and Courts to achieve a fair balance. 
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Without the list being exhaustive, we believe it captures the greatest conflicts, as 
they have been found until today. 
 
9. RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN IN RELATION TO FREEDOM OF EXRESSION 
Freedom of expression is enshrined in Article 10 para. 1 of the ECHR, 
Article 19 para. 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as national 
regulatory texts. At European Union level, freedom of expression is enshrined in 
Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which corresponds to Article 10 
ECHR ('Freedom of Expression and Information'). This right includes freedom of 
opinion, freedom to express views through Internet, television, books, published 
articles and art, as well as freedom to receive or impart information and ideas 
without interference by the authorities. 
 Freedom of expression, as protected by Article 10 § 1 of the ECHR, forms 
the basis of a democratic society73. The restrictions legally enforced on the right 
to freedom of expression as enshrined in all the above texts cannot go beyond 
what is provided for in Article 10 (2) of the ECHR. First, they must be provided by 
law and secondly, they must be necessary in a democratic society for protecting 
rights and freedoms of others.  
Nowadays, with the important role that the Internet plays in expressing 
opinions, it is much more urgent to see how the right to data protection is defined 
in relation to freedom of expression. For the press, the freedom to transmit and 
receive information, and the guarantees provided therein, are of particular 
importance. Press has a duty to impart information and ideas relating to the 
public interest74. Therefore, any measure restricting access to information which 
the public is entitled to receive must be justified on particularly compelling 
grounds75. In fact, in the judgment of the Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and 
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Shtekel v Ukraine76, the Court recognized that Article 10 of the ECHR should be 
interpreted as imposing a positive obligation on Member States to establish an 
appropriate regulatory framework to ensure effective protection of freedom of 
expression for online journalists. 
Τhe Ιnternet poses a lot of risks to both data protection and freedom of 
expression, which sometimes overlap and create legal issues that are even more 
problematic to their nature and much more difficult to resolve them.  
The Special Rapporteur on the United Nations Frank La Rue in the 2011 
report on promoting and protecting freedom of opinion and expression77, points 
out that the lack of adequate protection of privacy and personal data is an 
obstacle to the unhindered exercise of the right to freedom of expression. The 
lack of anonymity and the ability of governments and states to access user 
information are factors that undermine not only the right to privacy, but also 
freedom of expression, as users self-censorship, thus blocking the free online 
circulation of ideas and information. This is another interesting approach about 
how individual rights affect and ultimately shape each other. 
There are several cases of Internet users posts that raise issues of conflict 
between the two rights we are considering. First of all, the user posts something 
on a webpage and subsequently changes his/her opinion and seek to delete it. 
This case is the easiest and raises fewer problems, as almost all online services 
offer this right. However, we should highlight that there is a great distance 
between deleting spam from a website and deleting it from the Internet 
generally78. Another case is when the user posts something and someone else 
copies it and posts it himself/herself on his/her own website. In this case, if the 
original user requests the second to delete the content and the second user 
refuses to do so, then the only solution is to refer the first user to the web 
platform where the content is stored and ask for erasure. However, the online 
platform that is required to erase data from someone else's website based solely 
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on one user's request is in a difficult position to judge between the right to 
privacy of the first user and the freedom of expression of the second user. In this 
particular case there are questions also arise as to whether we want such 
decisions to be made by online platforms. Another case is when a user posts 
content about someone else, without being defamatory, so that the relevant 
criminal law can be applied. When it comes to truthful information which the data 
subject do not wish to become known or at least not further known, the conflict 
between freedom of expression and the right to privacy is inevitable and the 
legislator, as well as the judge, is required to balance those contradicting 
interests.  
As one can see from all the foregoing analysis, balancing the conflicting 
interests between the right to be forgotten and the freedom of expression is not 
easy and made more difficult by the fact that the right to be forgotten is still a 
vague concept79. 
As it is obvious, court decisions and legal texts are shaped in the light of 
technological developments. The GDPR is the only legal document at EU which 
governs the interaction and interconnection between Articles 8 and 11 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Ιn this context, courts at both national and 
European level are called upon to play a particularly difficult role. 
As the current case-law has developed it seems that there are some 
factors that play an important role in this difficult balance between different 
rights. Particularly important are the persons whose data are processed who 
happen to be public persons. Public persons means persons who hold public 
office and/or use public money or even all those who play a role in public life, 
such as politicians, athletes, actors, celebrities or any kind of public figure 
generally80. Furthermore, important for the right to be forgotten is the element of 
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time81, in the sense that it can change the balance between opposing interests: 
information that has been lawfully published at some point may no longer be 
lawful over time82. 
A key principle that follows the aforementioned is that the right to data 
protection and freedom of expression must be treated equally. A fair balance 
must always be sought and an ad hoc judgment must be made. Which right 
prevails in any particular case depends on the specific regulatory value that each 
right holds under each particular circumstance.  European Courts are oriented 
towards this point of view as shown by the case-law rulings.  
In Von Hannover v. Germany case83, the Court was asked to rule on 
whether the disclosure of private photos of Monaco Carolina violated Article 8 of 
the ECHR. The Court held that the decisive criterion for the distinction between 
the right to privacy and data protection of the subject and freedom of the press is 
whether the publications contribute to a debate of general interest. On 24 June 
2004, the Court unanimously ruled that there was a breach of Article 8. 
Furthermore, it accepted that scenes from daily life, involving activities such as 
engaging in sport, out walking, leaving a restaurant or on holiday were of a purely 
private nature and there were not of public interest. 
In case of Osterreichischer v Austria84 the European Court of Human Rights 
found that the Austrian authorities had acted in violation of the right to freedom 
of expression. The case concerned a reaction to a news item on the Austrian 
public television channel (Österreichischer Rundfunk). In a news programme 
broadcast by the channel in 1999, a picture was shown of a person, Mr. S. Mr. S.  
had been released on parole a few weeks earlier.  He was convicted to eight years 
imprisonment in 1995 because he had been found to be a leading member of a 
neo-Nazi organisation. At the request of Mr. S., the Austrian courts prohibited  
Österreichischer Rundfunk from showing his picture in connection with any report 
stating that he had been convicted  either once the sentence had been executed 
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or once he had been released on parole. The courts found that the publication of 
Mr. S.’s picture, in that particular way, had violated his rights.  
In Mosley v United Kingdom Case, Max Mosley, a former president of  the 
FIA (Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile, an association to represent the 
interests of motoring organisations) filed an application for breach of Articles 8 
and 13 of the Convention of the European Convention on Human Rights, claiming 
that United Kingdom failed to impose a legal obligation against News of the World 
(newspaper published in the United Kingdom from 1843 to 2011) to notify him 
before the publication a story regarding his private life. In this case, judges ruled 
in favor of United Kingdom. The court ruled that although there was a clear 
obligation to ensure that personal privacy was protected, there were existing 
protections in place, including the options of referral to the Press Complaints 
Commission (regulatory body for British printed newspapers and magazines) and 
the possibility of seeking (through it) civil damages. 
The CJEU both in Lindqvist85and in Satamedia86case decided that 
controllers could rely on freedom of expression derogations. In Lindqvist case, 
European Court of Justice, decided  that referring to particular persons on an 
internet page and identifying them by any way (by name or by another 
characteristic) constitutes processing of personal data by automatic means and is 
now allowed. In Satamedia case, found no violation of the right to freedom of 
expression where Finnish courts and authorities had prohibited two companies 
from processing personal tax data in the manner and to the extent that they had. 
The Court held that restrictions to the freedom of expression were compatible to 
law and aimed to protect personal data of taxpayers.  
 
10. RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN IN RELATION TO THE RIGHT TO HISTORICAL 
MEMORY 
Οne recent point of view is that the right to be forgotten may not be 
compatible with the right  to preserve the collective memory of humanity. In one 
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sense, deleting the past can affect mankind's future. In fact, it is difficult to build 
the future without retaining memories of the past, as the events of the past are 
what have brought us here87. The past passes and there is no way to change it. 
But, humanity needs points of reference in order to be able to move forward, 
while the need for one to know their roots, their past and be able to place 
themselves within a historical context is a fundamental need of every person  in 
today's rapidly changing societies.  
Actually, this issue is not just about important events or persons, but also 
about ‘every day people’, either through an individual approach (family 
history/family memory) or collective (social, journalistic, economic history of their 
country/continent). So, it is common argued that by deleting personal data from 
the Internet (files, links etc) it is argued that the remaining information becomes 
incomplete and does not reflect an accurate image of reality. Τhe truth is that this 
view contains a great deal of reality. But, on the other hand, there is the opposite 
opinion: societies need to forget in order to evolve and survive. The idea that 
people could remember everything, anytime seems to be a nightmare, as it fits 
into a society where people would stay attached to the past.  
The person seeking to erase his data in an effort to define himself/herself 
in a different way or even ‘reinvent’ himself/herself  is essentially trying to meet 
social expectations, needs and desires, which form part of the society in which 
the data subjects lives. This erasure not only leads to a different picture of a 
particular person but also to a different ‘reading’ of social reality over a specific 
period of time.  
Τhe need to reconcile a person's right to self-determination and the right 
to a true record of reality and history is a complex problem and highlights the 
complex relationship between memory, history and politics, which requires co-
operation and finding mutually acceptable solutions among historians, politicians, 
social and legal scientists88. 
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The European Parliament has also embraced this approach, when 
adopting the Proposal for a Regulation, adding a new article, which provides that 
personal data may go beyond what is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the initial 
processing for which they have collected for a period of time, to be processed by 
file services, which have as their primary duty or legal obligation to collect, store, 
classify, notify, exploit and the dissemination of archives for the public interest, in 
particular with a view to safeguarding human rights for historical, statistical or 
scientific purposes. All these must be taken into consideration in accordance with 
the rules laid down by Member States in the field of access, disclosure and 
dissemination of administrative or archival documents, and in accordance with 
the provisions of this Regulation concerning in particular consent and the right to 
object89. Finally, GDPR includes an exemption in paragraph 3 which allows a 
derogation from the grounds set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 for archiving purposes 
in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical 
purposes.  
Can deleting data deprive Europeans of their historical past and identity? 
This is a very difficult question and the answer is still quite vague. The ECHR has 
had to consider on several occasions the interpretation of the past. In the case of 
the Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine90, the Court stated that 
the Internet is an information and communication tool very different from the 
print media. The risk of damage to content on the Internet in the exercise and 
enjoyment of human rights, is clearly greater than that posed by the Press. 
Consequently, the policies governing the reproduction of print media and the 
Internet equivalent may differ, since the latter should be adapted to the specific 
characteristics of the technology in order to safeguard and promote the rights 
and freedoms concerned91.  
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There are many cases in which the ECHR had to balance between historical 
memory and the standards of human rights protection provided by the European 
Convention. Such an example is the PETA Deutschland v Germany Case92. In that 
case, the ECHR ruled that Germany did not violate Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights when it prevented the publication of posters that 
compared images of caged animals with those of concentration camp prisoners. 
The applicant was forbidden by German Courts to launch an advertising campaign 
under the slogan ‘The Holocaust on your plate’. The case originated when Jewish 
Holocaust survivors requested an injunction preventing the dissemination of 
posters highlighting the similarities between the mistreatment of animals and the 
suffering of victims in Nazi camps. The ECHR found that the injunction was a 
justifiable restriction as it sought to protect Jewish Holocaust survivors and that 
the German courts had properly struck a balance between freedom of expression 
and the obligation to respect  historical memories and the reputation of others.  
From all the aforementioned, we conclude that the legal framework 
should balance the opposing interests, protecting not only personal data but, at 
the same time, maintaining credible and authentic sources of history.  Last but 
not least, we must not overlook the power of the Internet and its ability to shape 
the flow of events. 
 
11. RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN IN RELATION TO THE FREEDOM TO CONDUCT 
A BUSINESS 
The ruling of the European Court of Justice against the Google in Google 
Spain case highlighted the problems that the existence and protection of the 
freedom to conduct a business can create. 
After the conviction of the company, thousands of requests have so far 
been received for the removal of results which individuals regard as outdated or 
unrealistic.  Each request needs to be carefully considered and this requires a 
great deal of effort on the behalf of companies.  Both colossal companies like 
Google and smaller businesses, like blogs, sites, online newspapers etc, need to 
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be very careful to the examination of these requests. The enormous amount of 
information available on the Internet makes it impossible to control it. It, also, 
makes necessary for each request to spend time verifying and cross-checking data 
to determine whether this information no longer needs to be available. This has 
as a result that each company should have a person who will be entrusted with 
this  difficult task. He/she must examine carefully all relevant information, 
balance the opposing interests and decide about the future of the content in 
dispute, while there is a risk of imposing huge fines. In this way the Internet 
Service Provider (eg search engine or social networking site) is overburdened as it 
is required to prove that there are specific reasons for keeping the information 
available.  
Article 16 of the EU Charter provides for freedom to conduct a business 
according to Union Law and national laws. The right actually endorse a 
commitment to a certain economical and political model, which promotes and 
safeguards the ability of people within the Union to be entrepreneurial93. 
According the CJEU the freedom to conduct a business includes the freedom to 
exercise an economic or commercial activity and free competition among 
others94. In fact, there is a great deal of discretion in interpreting this freedom.  
Ιn view of the aforementioned, it is clear that questions arise as to 
whether this interferences with the internal issues of the respective Internet 
Service Provider is acceptable and, whether, they ultimately affect the  freedom 
to conduct a business. Does the right to erasure make it effectively impossible for 
the economic operator to conduct its business? 
According to the CJEU, Article 16 is considered to be violated, when there 
are no viable alternatives and the business is effectively deprived of its freedom 
to contract95. Interests of the Internet Service Providers may be negatively 
affected to the extent the actual operation of erasure is disproportionately 
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difficult. This may happen when, from a technical perspective, erasure requires 
significant resources (eg. special technological equipment).  
As it becomes obvious, the crucial point is whether the right to erasure 
constitutes a justified interference to the ISS provider’s freedom to conduct a 
business. In practice, this problem can be solved by balancing opposing interests 
and applying the principle of proportionality on a case-by-case analysis.  
 
12. RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN IN RELATION TO THE RIGHT TO INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
Article 17 of the Charter protects both physical and intellectual property.  
In practice, many conflicts have been brought before the CJEU that relate to 
Internet Service Providers being asked to share the data of users suspect of IP 
infringement with rights holders.  
Promusicae v. Telefonica96 is one one the most famous cases. Promusicae, 
is a non-profit organization composed of producers and publishers of musical and 
audiovisual recordings. Promusicae asked the ECJ to order Telefonica (ISS), to 
reveal personal data of its users. The reason for that was that Telefonica’s users 
were allegedly accessing the IP-protected work of Promusicae clients without 
permission. The Court examined whether Member States, should impose 
obligations to Internet Service Providers in order to ensure effective protection of 
intellectual property rights. The Court found that Member States should not 
impose such obligations for the purpose of initiating civil proceedings for the 
protection of IP rights, and that, Member States must strike a fair balance 
between the rights at stake.  
Other well-known cases of this nature are Scarlet Extended v Sabam97 and 
SABAM  v Netlog98. The ECJ, in many of those cases found that, in order to ensure 
that there is a right to a remedy against persons whose intellectual property 
rights have been violated by Internet Service Providers of their users, the 
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operator of an online platform (marketplace) may be ordered to take measures to 
make it easier to identify clients99.  
In all these cases the Court attached great importance to the personal 
data of users of Internet Service Providers by not allowing their behavior to be 
controlled and their data to be transferred without safeguards. Zooming into the 
right to erasure  in particular, we can say that Article 17 Charter might be invoked 
against erasure requests that would effectively ‘remove traces’ of data subjects’ 
IP infringements (e.g. asking internet access providers to erase IP-logs).  The 
answer to this is Article 17(3)e under which, unless there is an ongoing 
investigation, it will not be possible  to block erasure requests because of the right 
to intellectual property.  Αt this point it is worth mentioning the Recital 63 GDPR, 
which highlights the elements mentioned above. According to this provision, 
access rights should not affect intellectual property but also, intellectual property 
cannot be used as an excuse to refuse access.  
In conclusion, it is acceptable that IP rights could justify access restrictions. 
But, intellectual property should not be used as a ‘panacea’ to reject all or most of 
the erasure requests. Article 17 should have a substantial impact on the particular 
case in the light of accountability and proportionality.  
 
13. TIME AS A CRITERION ABOUT ERASURE OR RETENTION OF DATA 
As it is clear from all of the aforementioned there are many arguments  for 
both the erasure and  the retention of personal data. Βut in order to make a final 
decision on whether or not to erase, a balance must be made between different 
factors. European case law seems to take into consideration the time factor.  
In Delfi AS v Estonia case100, the ECHR stated that the spread of the 
Internet increases the possibility that information once made public will remain 
public and circulate forever, regardless of the data subject’s will. In Editions Plon 
v. France case101 the applicant, a publishing company and the authors of a book 
which contained information about former French President Mitterrand’s secret 
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health problem, were stopped through a court injunction by the family of 
President Mitterrand from distributing the book. The applicant filed a complaint 
relying on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights  and alleged 
that the order forbidding it to continue distribution of the book had infringed its 
right to the freedom of expression. The Court found that there had been no 
violation of Article 10 and held that the subsequent ruling to ban the book was in 
violation of Article 10 because it no longer met a pressing social need nine 
months into the Presidents death. Hence the interference with applicant's right to 
freedom of expression was no longer justified. 
As it is obvious that ‘time’ is a crucial factor about the retention or erasure 
of certain information. The information one chooses to share at a particular time 
of his/her life does not necessarily mean that they want to follow him/her 
forever. This phenomenon can take a large toll on both personal and professional 
life. The example of the "Drunk pirate" mentioned very often in the literature102: 
Stacy Snyder, a graduate of the pedagogical school, posted on a social network 
page a photo of her wearing a pirate hat and holding a plastic cup, while writing in 
the caption that accompanied the photo the phrase "drunken pirate". The school 
in which she did her internship found that she promoted the consumption of 
alcohol by minors and her behavior was inappropriate and unacceptable for the 
University. As a result, she was not allowed to complete her internship and did 
not receive a degree in pedagogy. Snyder argued that she had the right to post 
the photo, but the Court rejected her claim on the ground that she was a civil 
servant and her plea was not in the public interest. Αfter the publicity of this case, 
many questions were raised about how a post can affect a person's life after years 
and if it is fair to determine some important choices in data subject’s life or if 
there should be a way for that ‘mistake’ to be forgotten. 
Actually, the right to be forgotten is invoked in situations where an 
individual’s personal life is publicly exposed. A careful balancing exercise with 
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other fundamental rights will be imperative. In striking this balance, time may 
play a determinative role103.  
It is hard to draw clear conclusions about the role of ‘time’ within data 
protection context. However, we can say that, on the one hand, time is a factor 
adding or removing weight to the request to remove personal data while, on the 
other hand, time can play role as the marker of the tipping point when the 
grounds for retention no longer hold and erasure of the data should follow104.  
Generally, it is an undisputable fact that the older information is, the less valuable 
retaining it is.   
Another important thing that should be considered in combination with 
time is the purpose limitation principle. Once the stated purpose is reached, there 
is no longer a legitimate ground for data retention, regardless of time. From this 
time data retention is no longer legitimate.  
In conclusion, it is true that digital information sources have ‘eternal 
memory’. But, this memory requires the implementation of a form of a digital 
forgetting. Balancing these interests is quite difficult but it is a fact that ‘time’ is a 
factor that supports forgetting, when enough time has elapsed since the 
publication of an information105. 
 
14. TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES IN APPLYING THE RIGHT TO BE 
FORGOTTEN 
Beyond the legal dimensions of the right to be forgotten, a brief reference 
should also be made to some technological issues that are inextricably linked to 
the erasure of personal data. 
The fundamental technological challenges in applying the right to be 
forgotten lie especially on the following: 1) whether people are allowed to 
identify and locate stored personal data related to them, 2) whether identifying 
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all copies of information and 3) determining whether the person who asks for the 
erasure has the right to do so.  
According to the first two issues should be briefly mentioned: The 
enforcement of the right to be forgotten is depend on the characteristics of the 
information system in question106. In essence, this is only possible in so-called 
“closed”107 systems where information is processed, stored and transmitted in a 
particular context, preventing data from being distributed to sites where erasure 
 cannot be accomplished. Information coexists in a way that the right to be 
forgotten can be enforced, each request is authenticated and recorded, and data 
and/or information is communicated directly to individuals and organizations.  
Systems such as corporate and public networks seem to meet these 
standards. On the other hand, in an “open” system 108such as the Internet, public 
data can be accessed by interested members with online identities that cannot be 
shared with natural persons. These interested members have the ability to 
redistribute the information to non-confidential persons, resulting in mass 
copying of data. In such a system, there is no appropriate technical approach to 
enforce the right to be forgotten. This case is quite common on the Internet, 
especially when personal data is included on social media, blogs etc.  
In addition, to personal data being processed in an open or closed system, 
special attention should also be paid to the way data stored on discarded storage 
equipment, such as magnetic storage devices and flash discs for smart mobile 
devices, notebooks, desktops and usb sticks. The simple erasure of files on these 
devices is considered inadequate to prevent data recovery, which is feasible by 
using simple and widely available artificial means. Another important issue is the 
person who asks for the erasure. It is quite difficult for a data controller/processor 
by himself/herself to take this decision without legal help.  
In summary, it is worth noting that all technical approaches to safeguard 
the right to be forgotten are vulnerable to unauthorized creation of 
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copies, and disperse them when they expire. Thus, the right to be forgotten 
cannot be guaranteed by technical means alone. It is clear that a more complete 
solution will include legal requirements to make it practically difficult to find 
personal data that has expired. 
 
15. CONCLUSIONS 
In this Dissertation Thesis was examined the fundamental right to data 
protection and especially the right to erasure as a part of it. We also examine the 
concepts of the right to erasure, its material and personal scope, as well as, its 
relationship with other fundamental rights, in the light of General Data Protection 
Regulation and relevant decisions of the European Court of Justice. We also, 
examine time, which is an important element to be taken into account in 
balancing opposing interests.  
The right to be forgotten, as it has been shaped till today, is certainly not 
complete and not clear. But it is a small step forward that contributes to data 
subject’s protection.  
An important problem to be understood is that any attempt to legislate in 
Europe reflects a specific political and legal compromise under the specific 
circumstances and within a specific social economic and technological context. It 
is true that the adoption of internet-related legislation faces significant 
difficulties, which have mentioned many times above: the speed of technological 
developments, the lack of speed of legislators, the nature of Internet are some of 
the problems.  These problems need to be overcome with the co-operation of 
both legal and technological science.  
However, ‘legalization’ of the right to be forgotten is now needed more 
than ever because Internet has become uncontrolled and individuals feel helpless. 
It is very important common practices (or even an international treaty someday) 
to be applied in all countries because the problem of protecting personal data on 
the Internet extends beyond the borders of the European Union. A legal 
regulatory framework is needed to ensure legal certainty in the management of 
personal data.  
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Article 17 of GDPR recognizes the right of data subjects to request for the 
erasure of their personal data provided there is a legal basis for doing so. 
However, the successful exercise of this right is not so clear. In order to do this, 
data subject must prove that: a) the inclusion of a particular search result 
associated with his/her name causes significant harm to his interests and b) that 
his/hers interests override those of the search engine.  
In practice, it is really difficult to apply the right to erasure. Firstly, one 
needs to know if the right can be invoked in the first place. In case the answer is 
yes, secondly, one needs to evaluate how the right to erasure can be applied in a 
balanced way,  considering all interests, rights and freedoms at stake. 
GDPR installs a fair balancing framework that safeguards any fundamental 
rights and freedoms as they are affected by the processing of personal data. 
Courts are also oriented in this direction. But still there are several potential 
hurdles that might obstruct an effective exercise of the right to erasure. These 
may arise from legal measures safeguarding other fundamental rights, freedoms 
and interests.  
It is obvious that the problems cannot be solved overnight, but a sound 
regulatory  infrastructure is absolutely necessary to ensure both the protection of 
individuals and that the expansion of Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) occurs in a manner that respects fundamental rights, freedoms 
and interests.  
After all, should there be a right that make search engines erase 
information about individuals? Should there be a right to be forgotten? The 
answer is absolutely yes. But should search engines erase each and every 
information requested be data subjects? Sometimes the answer is yes and 
sometimes the answer is no. Each case is different and nobody could give an 
answer in advance.  
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